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Abstract
A New-Keynesian macro model is estimated accommodating regime-switching behavior in monetary
policy and macro shocks. Key to our estimation strategy is the use of survey-based expectations for in-
ﬂation and output. Output and inﬂation shocks shift to the low volatility regime around 1985 and 1990,
respectively. Monetary Policy experiences multiple shifts with an important role in shaping macro volatility.
New estimates of the onset and demise of the Great Moderation are provided and the relative role played
by macro-shocks and monetary policy is quantiﬁed. The estimated rational expectations model exhibits
indeterminacy in the mean-square stability sense, mainly due to passive monetary policy.
JEL Classification: E31, E32, E52, E58, C42, C53
Keywords: Markov-Switching (MS) DSGE models, Survey Expectations, Great Moderation, Monetary
Policy, Determinacy in MS DSGE models
1. Introduction1
The Great Moderation, the reduction in volatility (standard deviation) observed in most macro variables2
since the mid-1980s, makes it diﬃcult to explain macroeconomic dynamics in the US over the last 40 years3
within a linear homoskedastic framework. There is still no consensus on whether the Great Moderation4
represents a structural break or rather a persistent but temporary change in regime. The causes also5
remain the subject of much debate. Was the Great Moderation the result of a reduction in the volatility of6
economic shocks, or was it brought about by a change in the propagation of shocks, for instance through7
a more aggressive monetary policy? Articles in favor of the “shock explanation” include McConnell and8
Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000), Sims and Zha (2006), Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011); articles in favor of the policy9
channel include Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ı and Gambetti (2008). Nevertheless, there is10
empirical evidence of both changes in the variance of economic shocks (Sims and Zha (2006)) and persistent11
changes in monetary policy (see Cogley and Sargent (2005), Boivin (2006), and Lubik and Schorfheide12
(2004)), necessitating an empirical framework that can accommodate both.13
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In this article, we estimate a standard New-Keynesian model accommodating regime changes in system-14
atic monetary policy, in the variance of discretionary monetary policy shocks and in the variance of economic15
shocks. Whereas the model implies the presence of recurring regimes, it can also produce near permanent16
changes in regime. With the structural model, the timing of the onset of the Great Moderation, and it so17
happens, also its demise, is revisited. Moreover, the sources of changes in the volatility of macroeconomic18
outcomes are traced to changes in the volatility of demand, supply and discretionary monetary policy shocks,19
and to changes in systematic monetary policy. Output and inﬂation shocks moved to a lower variability20
regime in 1985 and 1990, respectively, but moved back to the higher variability regime towards the end of21
2008. Systematic monetary policy became more active after 1980, whereas discretionary monetary policy22
shocks were much less frequent after 19851. The aggressive lowering of interest rates in the 2000-2005 period23
preceding the recent ﬁnancial crisis is characterized as an activist regime. Put together, the 1980-2007 period24
is identiﬁed as a period with substantially lower output and inﬂation variability. From several perspectives,25
including counterfactual analysis, monetary policy was a critical driver of the Great Moderation.26
While our model is a Rational Expectations model, survey forecasts for inﬂation and GDP are used in its27
estimation. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) show that survey expectations beat any other model in forecasting28
future inﬂation out of sample. The use of survey forecasts not only brings additional information to bear on a29
complex estimation problem, but also simpliﬁes the identiﬁcation of the regimes under certain assumptions.30
In the extant literature, survey forecasts have mostly been used to provide alternative estimates of the31
Phillips curve (see Roberts (1995) and Adam and Padula (2011)). Instead, we study the role of survey32
expectations in shaping macroeconomic dynamics in the context of a standard New Keynesian (NK) model,33
accommodating regime switches.34
While current medium-scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models typically feature35
more variables and richer dynamics (see, for instance, Smets and Wouters (2007), Del Negro, Schorfheide,36
Smets, and Wouters (2007)), this article deliberately focuses on a small scale New-Keynesian model with37
an output gap, inﬂation, and interest rate equation for several reasons. First of all, this is the ﬁrst attempt38
to estimate a small-scale DSGE model with survey-based expectations, which by themselves comprise very39
valuable information about a large set of variables. As a result, it is both instructive and relevant to focus40
on a relatively simple benchmark which also facilitates comparing estimation results with previous studies.41
Second, the model is rich enough to capture the time-varying role of both monetary policy and the key42
shocks shaping the Great Moderation in terms of output and inﬂation. Medium-scale models incorporating43
capital and labor explicitly may account for output ﬂuctuations better than our model, but we conjecture44
that the identiﬁcation of inﬂation dynamics, monetary policy, and the Great Moderation would not be45
greatly aﬀected. Third, the estimation of even a stylized model with a realistic number of regimes remains46
actually very complex. Part or our contribution is to embed survey forecasts in the estimation and to obtain47
a Markov-Switching Rational Expectations (MSRE) Equilibrium, applying recent results in Cho (2014).48
Recent progress in DSGE models incorporating regime-switching and time variation of structural param-49
eters includes Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez50
(2010). These articles use very diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies, and do not make use of survey expectations.51
Modeling diﬀerences are discussed further in the model section. Our analysis of the rational expectations52
equilibrium in a Markov-switching New-Keynesian model extends Davig and Leeper (2007) to an empirically53
more realistic setting, and is therefore closely related to Bianchi (2013). His model is a medium-scale DSGE54
model which diﬀerentiates the eﬀects of macro shocks on consumption and investment. In his model, all55
macro shocks switch simultaneously, whereas in our model shocks are allowed to switch independently. As56
a result, our model displays many more diﬀerent regimes (16) than his (4). Because the origin of supply,57
demand, and monetary policy shocks is by deﬁnition very diﬀerent, our speciﬁcation is likely more realistic.58
As in Bianchi (2013), our model produces a stabilizing switch towards active monetary policy in the early59
80s; but afterwards our model identiﬁes several MP switches whereas in Bianchi (2013) there is only one60
more switch in monetary policy towards the end of the sample. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) also estimate61
1Throughout the article we use active or activist policy to indicate the monetary policy regime where the interest rate reacts
to expected inﬂation more than one to one, in contrast to passive monetary policy.
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a New-Keynesian model with switches in shocks and the inﬂation target, but do not accommodate switches62
in policy response coeﬃcients, which we identify as key to explain historical U.S. macro dynamics.63
None of the aforementioned studies analyzes determinacy, an important characteristic of rational ex-64
pectations models. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) document indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker65
period and discuss the estimation biases arising when indeterminate equilibria are excluded. Applying the66
methodology developed by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011), the estimated New-Keynesian model is found67
to be indeterminate in the mean-square stability sense. Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner,68
and Zha (2009) have previously shown that a temporarily passive monetary policy can be admissible as a69
part of a determinate equilibrium in simple calibrated MSRE models. However, in our more complex model70
featuring endogenous persistence, the actual policy stance in the passive regime for the U.S. economy during71
the 1968-2008 period is estimated to be excessively passive relative to the active regime, thereby causing72
indeterminacy. The recent return to a passive regime also contributed to the end of the Great Moderation.73
Policy parameter conﬁgurations that ensure a determinate equilibrium are characterized.74
Section 2 describes the New-Keynesian model, detailing the role of regime-switching and expectations75
formation. Section 3 discusses the data and estimation method. Section 4 presents the empirical results,76
emphasizing the parameter estimates and the identiﬁed regimes. Section 5 concludes.77
2. The Model78
This section ﬁrst describes the baseline New-Keynesian model. Subsequently, regime switches are introduced79
and the resulting rational expectations equilibrium analyzed. Finally, survey expectations are incorporated80
into the model.81
2.1. The basic New-Keynesian model82
Consider the following three-variable-three-equation New-Keynesian macro model, a benchmark of much83
recent monetary policy and macroeconomic analysis:84
πt = δEtπt+1 + (1− δ)πt−1 + λyt + π,t, π,t ∼ N(0, σ2π) (1)
yt = µEtyt+1 + (1− µ)yt−1 − φ(it − Etπt+1) + y,t, y,t ∼ N(0, σ2y) (2)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[βEtπt+1 + γyt] + i,t, i,t,∼ N(0, σ2i ) (3)
where πt is the inﬂation rate, yt is the output gap and it is the nominal interest rate. Et is the conditional85
expectations operator. The three equations are subject to aggregate supply (AS), aggregate demand (IS)86
and monetary policy shocks, respectively. We denote these shocks by π,t (AS-shock), y,t (IS-shock), and87
i,t (monetary policy shock). The δ and µ parameters represent the degree of forward-looking behavior88
in the AS equation (reﬂecting ﬁrm behavior) and IS equation (reﬂecting consumer behavior), respectively89
(see Woodford (2003)). If they are not equal to one the model features endogenous persistence. The φ90
parameter measures the impact of changes in real interest rates on output and λ the eﬀect of output on91
inﬂation. The monetary policy reaction function is a forward-looking Taylor rule with smoothing parameter92
ρ. While policy rules featuring contemporaneous rather than expected inﬂation are still popular (see e.g.93
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010)), it is well accepted that policy makers94
consider expected measures of inﬂation in their policy decisions (see Bernanke (2010), Boivin and Giannoni95
(2006a)). Policy should not react to temporary shocks that aﬀect the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation,96
but not the future path of inﬂation.97
The model is a simple example of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) macro model,98
characterized by a set of diﬀerence equations where today’s decisions are a function of expected future99
macro variables as well as lags of the endogenous variables. These equations represent the log-linearized100
ﬁrst-order conditions of the optimizing problems faced by a representative agent, ﬁrms, and the monetary101
authority. In matrix form, the model can be expressed as:102
AXt = BEtXt+1 +DXt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ) (4)
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where Xt is the vector of macro variables and t is the vector of structural macro shocks. A,B, and D are103
matrices of structural parameters and Σ is the diagonal variance matrix of t. Throughout this article, a104
rational expectations equilibrium (REE, henceforth) is considered that depends only on the minimum state105
variables following McCallum (1983), also referred to as a fundamental solution. The solution to model (4)106
then follows a VAR(1) law of motion:107
Xt = ΩXt−1 + Γt (5)
where Ω and Γ are highly non-linear functions of the structural parameters, which can be solved following108
Klein (2000), Sims (2002), or Cho and Moreno (2011). Discussion of the characterization of the rational109
expectations equilibria is postponed to Section 2.3.110
Macro models often have a hard time ﬁtting non-linear macro dynamics. While there are many potential111
reasons for this, we focus on two. First, there is considerable evidence of parameter instability. As noted112
by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), the monetary authority may have learned over time to react more113
aggressively to inﬂation deviations from target in order to tame output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations, leading114
to instability in the systematic monetary policy parameters. In addition, the Great Moderation literature115
(McConnell and Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez116
(2007), and Sims and Zha (2006)) shows that the output shocks identiﬁed in both reduced-form and struc-117
tural models are heteroskedastic, displaying a pronounced decline after the mid 1980s. As a result, econo-118
metricians have tried to accommodate these parameter changes through subsample analysis (Clarida, Gal´ı,119
and Gertler (1999), Moreno (2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006a)), time varying structural parameter120
and volatility estimation (Kim and Nelson (2006), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007), Ang,121
Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung (2010)) or through regime-switching models (Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and122
Sims and Zha (2006)). Our model incorporates regime-switching behavior in both systematic monetary123
policy and the variances of the structural shocks. The other parameters are assumed time invariant because124
they arise from micro-founded models.125
Second, the rational expectations assumption may constrain the ability of the current generation of126
macro models to characterize macro dynamics. Chief among these shortcomings is the fact that agents127
only employ the variables used to construct the model in forming expectations of future macro variables.128
Given that most macro models only use a limited number of variables, the information sets used by RE129
agents seem to be unrealistically constrained2. There are a number of potential avenues to overcome this130
problem. The generalized method of moments (GMM) allows researchers to condition the estimation of131
model parameters on information sets which include additional variables to those implied by the model (see,132
for instance, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)). Boivin and Giannoni (2006b) estimate a DSGE RE macro133
model, enhancing the information set available to agents for decision making purposes with a large number134
of macro variables governed by a factor structure. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010), Bikbov and Chernov135
(2013), and Rudebusch and Wu (2008) use term structure data to help identify a New-Keynesian macro136
model. The work of Bikbov and Chernov (2013) is most closely related to ours, as they also allow regime137
shifts in the shock variances and systematic monetary policy. However, their identiﬁcation strategy is very138
diﬀerent, as they use term structure data and an exogenous pricing kernel (inconsistent with the IS curve)139
to price the term structure.140
Instead, we use survey-based expectations (SBE) to help identify the parameters of a DSGE macro model.141
SBE reﬂect the direct answers of a large number of economic agents to questions about the expected future142
path of macroeconomic variables. Unlike RE, SBE are thus not model conditioned and naturally reﬂect143
the diﬀerent perceptions of economic agents based on a potentially very rich information set. Recently,144
2Moreover, RE imply that all agents have a perfect knowledge of the model and only adjust their expectations in reaction
to the model dynamics in order to reach the equilibrium, leaving no room for any alternative perceptions or mechanisms
which in practice would likely alter their decisions. According to Solow (2004), Phelps (2007) and Woodford (2013), this tight
endogeneity of the RE framework may impair its ability to explain macro dynamics. On the theoretical side, De Grauwe (2008)
develops a DSGE model where agents exhibit bounded rationality, whereas Sims (2005) introduces the rational inattention
concept, relaxing some of the RE assumptions. In addition, Onatski and Stock (2002), among others, develop techniques to
perform policy analysis in the presence of model, parameter and shock uncertainty around a reference model, thus leaving some
room for macro realizations to deviate from a benchmark model with perfectly known parameters and forcing processes.
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several authors (Roberts (1995), Adam and Padula (2011) and Nunes (2010)) have estimated New-Keynesian145
Phillips curves using SBE. The results of these eﬀorts have overall been positive, as the estimate of the146
important Phillips curve parameter, linking inﬂation to the output gap, becomes statistically signiﬁcant147
under SBE, in contrast to the results produced by most RE models. Nevertheless, the use of SBE in DSGE148
macro models has been limited to date and restricted to single-equation estimation. Of course, there is149
much skepticism about SBE: agents may not be truth-telling or may omit important information in forming150
forecasts of future macro variables. However, Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) show that SBE of inﬂation151
predict inﬂation out-of-sample better than a large number of the standard structural and reduced-form152
inﬂation models proposed in the literature.3 Consequently, SBE likely contain important information about153
future macro variables. It is shown below that incorporating SBE greatly facilitates the computation of the154
likelihood function and thus the identiﬁcation of the regime shifts.155
2.2. Introducing regime switches156
To model regime shifts in the nature of systematic monetary policy and in the variances of the structural157
shocks, there are 4 regime variables. The ﬁrst variable smpt switches β and γ in equation (3), which represent158
the systematic monetary policy parameters. The second variable sπt shifts the volatility of the aggregate159
supply shocks. The third variable syt shifts the volatility of the IS shocks. The fourth variable s
i
t aﬀects the160
volatility of the monetary policy shock. These variables can take on two values and follow Markov chains161
with constant transition probabilities in the Hamilton (1989) tradition. The agents are assumed to know162
the regime at each point in time so that learning issues are dispensed with. In particular, agents rationally163
account for potential future regime shifts in monetary policy when taking expectations. The regime variables164
are assumed independent. For future reference, let St = (s
mp
t , s
π
t , s
y
t , s
i
t).165
The regime-dependent volatility model for the three shocks in equation (4) simply allows for two diﬀerent166
values of the conditional variance, as a function of the regime variable. For example, for the AS equation,167
the shock variance is:168
V ar (π,t|Xt−1, St) = σ2π (sπt ) = exp (απ,0 + απ,1sπt ) (6)
with sπt = 1, 2 and the exponential function guaranteeing non-negative volatilities. We adopt the convention169
that the variance in regime 1 is higher than the variance of regime 2 for each structural shock: σ2π (s
π
t = 1) >170
σ2π (s
π
t = 2) , σ
2
y (s
y
t = 1) > σ
2
y (s
y
t = 2) , σ
2
i
(
sit = 1
)
> σ2i
(
sit = 2
)
.171
The regime variable smpt accommodates potential persistent shifts in the systematic policy parameters β172
and γ. In particular, we expect to ﬁnd an activist regime with β larger than 1 and a passive regime with β173
smaller than 1. A number of economists (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Boivin and Giannoni (2006a))174
suggest that β experienced a structural break around 1980, with β being lower than 1 before and larger175
thereafter. While ex ante implausible, such a model can still be approximated by our regime-switching176
model if the regimes are very persistent with very small transition probabilities. Nevertheless, in our model,177
a switch to a new regime is never viewed as permanent. If regime classiﬁcation yields a passive regime178
100% of the time before 1980, and an activist regime 100% of the time afterwards, the permanent break179
hypothesis surely gains credence relative to a model of persistent but non-permanent changes in policy. It180
is also possible that the inﬂuential 1979-1982 Volcker period aﬀects inference substantially. Was this period181
the ﬁrst switch into a more active regime or is it best viewed as a period of discretionary contractionary182
policy? By letting the variable sit aﬀect the variability of the monetary policy shock, the latter possibility183
is also accommodated.184
Incorporating the regime variables, equation (4) becomes:185
A(St)Xt = B(St)EtXt+1 +DXt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (7)
where A(St) and B(St) capture the regime-switching behavior of the central bank and Σ(St) governs the186
time-varying variances of the structural shocks. With regimes aﬀecting both systematic monetary policy187
3Boivin (2006), for instance, uses the Greenbook forecasts employed before each FOMC meeting by the Fed in order to
identify changes in its stance against inﬂation. These forecasts include information from a wide range of sources, including
forecasters’ opinions.
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and the variance of shocks, the question of what drove down inﬂation and output growth variability dur-188
ing the 1980s and 1990s can be revisited: was it policy or luck (see e.g. Stock and Watson (2002) and189
Blanchard and Simon (2001))? A large literature has examined this issue from both reduced-form (Cogley190
and Sargent (2005), McConnell and Pe´rez-Quiro´s (2000), Sims and Zha (2006)) and structural (Moreno191
(2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006a), and Inoue and Rossi (2011)) perspec-192
tives. Disagreement remains. For instance, Benati and Surico (2009) show that the results of Sims and Zha193
(2006), suggesting a prominent role for heteroskedasticity, may be biased against ﬁnding a role for policy194
changes. The combination of a structural New-Keynesian model with regime shifts in both monetary policy195
parameters and shock variables can provide novel evidence on the sources of macroeconomic variability.196
Our model ﬁts into a rapidly growing body of work incorporating policy changes and/or heteroskedasticity197
into New-Keynesian models. Part of this literature is more theoretical in nature, considering issues of198
equilibrium existence and stability, in models that are not likely to be empirically successful. This important199
literature is discussed in Section 2.3. The empirical literature on DSGEs with time-varying parameter and200
shock distribution is very recent. Some authors, such as Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007)201
and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), postulate heteroskedastic variances and ﬁxed structural parameters202
in their DSGEs, whereas Davig and Doh (2013) develop a New-Keynesian model with regime-switching203
parameters but constant shock variances. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez204
(2010), Bianchi (2013) and Bikbov and Chernov (2013) allow for time variation in both the structural shock205
variances and the systematic part of their RE New-Keynesian macro models, and are thus closest to our206
framework. Bianchi (2013) uses only one regime variable to accommodate heteroskedasticity. Below this is207
shown to be overly restrictive. Our use of SBE also allows for a much simpler estimation method than is208
possible in Bianchi (2013).209
2.3. The rational expectations equilibrium under regime-switching210
A linear rational expectations model (4) is said to be determinate if it has a unique and stable (non-211
explosive) equilibrium, which takes the form of a fundamental REE as in equation (5). In case of indeter-212
minacy, the models generally have multiple fundamental and non-fundamental (“sunspot”) equilibria. It is213
now well-understood that a violation of the Taylor principle, typically identiﬁed as β being less than 1 in214
equation (3), leads to indeterminate equilibria in the prototypical New-Keynesian model. Intuitively, raising215
the short-term nominal interest rate less than one for one to an increase in (expected) inﬂation actually216
lowers the real rate, fueling inﬂation even more through output gap expansion and the Phillips curve mech-217
anism. However, the US data seem to suggest a structural break in β, with β lower than 1 (“passive policy’)218
before 1980 and higher than 1 (“active policy”) afterwards (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Boivin and219
Giannoni (2006a)). From the perspective of a standard New-Keynesian model, this implies that the propa-220
gation system was not uniquely determined before 1980 and/or that non-fundamental (sunspot) equilibria221
may have played a role before 1980 (see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)).222
Recently, Davig and Leeper (2007) generalized the Taylor principle to a baseline New-Keynesian macro223
model with regime-switching in monetary policy, which is nested in the model of equation (7). Speciﬁcally,224
they show that the model can have a unique stable equilibrium even when the central bank is temporarily225
passive as long as there is a positive probability that the passive regime switches to the active regime,226
and the structural shocks are bounded. Consequently, a Markov-switching rational expectations model227
(MSRE for short), apart from being more economically reasonable than a permanent break model, oﬀers228
the potential to explain US macro-dynamics, even before 1980, in the context of a model with a unique and229
stable equilibrium.230
It is therefore important to fully characterize the stability and determinacy of the equilibrium for the231
US economy. To do so, a stability concept (to rule out unstable solutions) must be deﬁned and veriﬁed,232
and fundamental solutions to the model must be identiﬁed. Following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2010),233
this paper adopts mean-square stability as the primary concept of stability. Hence, the ﬁrst and second234
moments of Xt are required to be ﬁnite. The bounded stability concept that Davig and Leeper (2007) and235
Benhabib (2009) use essentially requires bounded random variables, and is not suitable in our framework236
for two reasons. Determinacy conditions under bounded stability have not been established for models with237
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predetermined variables, and the support of structural shocks in our model is unbounded as they follow238
normal distributions.239
Following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009, 2011), the general solution to our model (7) is expressed240
as a sum of a fundamental solution and a non-fundamental (sunspot) component:241
Xt = Ω(St)Xt−1 + Γ (St) εt + ut, (8)
s.t. ut = F (St)Etut+1 (9)
where the ﬁrst two components in (8) represent a fundamental solution given by equation (7) and ut is242
a sunspot component. Note that the state variables in this model are the vector of lagged endogenous243
variables, Xt−1, the vector of the exogenous variables, t and the current set of regimes St. The restrictions244
that Ω (St), Γ (St) and F (St) must satisfy in a rational expectations equilibrium can be easily derived by245
plugging equation (8) into equation (7). Determinacy then requires two conditions: the uniqueness of the246
stable fundamental solution and the non-existence of stable sunspot components.247
Establishing determinacy conditions for the general MSRE model with lagged endogenous variables248
is far from trivial, and the extant literature is not useful. For example, Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha249
(2011) propose a method to identify model solutions using a numerical procedure. However, since the250
number of fundamental solutions is unknown, such a procedure cannot really establish the ﬁrst determinacy251
condition. Furthermore, Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) propose a condition for the second determinacy252
requirement, but it is only valid in models without lagged variables and therefore does not apply to our model253
either. Therefore, new results in Cho (2014), who generalizes the “forward method” introduced by Cho and254
Moreno (2011) for linear models, are relied upon. The forward solution for a linear RE model results from255
solving the model recursively forward. The forward solution is the unique fundamental solution that satisﬁes256
no-bubble (or transversality) condition; the condition that makes the expectations of the present value of257
future endogenous variables converge to zero. Consequently, the forward solution selects an economically258
reasonable fundamental equilibrium and delivers the numerical solution in one step. Importantly, Cho (2014)259
shows that this logic carries over to MSRE models and develops very tractable determinacy conditions in260
the mean-square stability sense for general MSRE models with predetermined variables.4261
To develop some intuition, consider an n−dimensional linear RE model, a special case of our model262
in the absence of regime-switching, so that all the coeﬃcient matrices of the model and the solution are263
constant. This linear RE model is known to have 2n generalized eigenvalues and it is determinate if there264
exist exactly n stable roots (see Klein (2000), for instance). McCallum (2007) shows that the n roots of265
Ω in equation (8) and the reciprocals of the roots of the associated F in equation (9) constitute those 2n266
generalized eigenvalues. Using this observation, determinacy can be equivalently stated as follows: the linear267
RE model is determinate if there exists an Ω and its associated F such that268
r(Ω) < 1 and r(F ) ≤ 1, (10)
where r(·) is the spectral radius, the maximum absolute eigenvalue of the argument matrix.5 The latter269
condition has a straightforward interpretation from ut = FEtut+1 in equation (9): r(F ) ≤ 1 implies that the270
second determinacy condition holds so that there is no stable sunspot component ut (the expected sunspot271
is explosively related to the current sunspot as the inverse of F has unstable eigenvalues). This condition272
in conjunction with the ﬁrst condition regarding Ω then ensures that there is unique stable fundamental273
solution, hence the model is determinate.274
In a MSRE set-up, these conditions must take into account that there are transitions between diﬀerent275
regimes and thus between diﬀerent coeﬃcient matrices. Focussing on a simple model without lagged state276
variables, Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) show that the determinacy conditions involve transition prob-277
abilities and the second moments of the variables. Cho (2014) derives the determinacy conditions for more278
4Section A of the online appendix provides technical details about the methodology. The online Appendix associated with
this paper can be found at http://TO BE ASSIGNED.
5The ﬁrst condition in (10) implies that there are n stable generalized eigenvalues and the latter condition implies that the
remaining n generalized eigenvalues are unstable.
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general MSRE models that are analogous to the conditions in equation (10). In particular, our model (7) is279
determinate if there exists a solution of the form (8)-(9) such that280
r(D¯Ω) < 1 and r(DF ) ≤ 1, (11)
where D¯Ω and DF are the transition probability weighted matrices deﬁned as
6:281
D¯Ω =
[
p11Ω(1)⊗ Ω(1) p21Ω(1)⊗ Ω(1)
p12Ω(2)⊗ Ω(2) p22Ω(2)⊗ Ω(2)
]
, DF =
[
p11F (1)⊗ F (1) p12F (1)⊗ F (1)
p21F (2)⊗ F (2) p22F (2)⊗ F (2)
]
. (12)
with Ω(i), F (i), for i = 1, 2, denoting the coeﬃcient matrices associated with regime i. Recall that in282
equations (8) and (9) the state St only depends on the monetary policy regime s
mp
t , so the two states 1283
and 2 represent the active and passive regimes, respectively. Therefore the probabilities in equation (12),284
represent transition probabilities between active and passive policy regimes, pij = P
[
smpt = i|smpt−1 = j
]
.285
Therefore, to check for determinacy, the matrices in equation (12) must be computed and their spectral286
radii checked.287
Cho (2014) simpliﬁes this process making use of the so-called forward solution. As in the linear RE288
model, r(DF ) ≤ 1 implies the non-existence of stable sunspot components. He shows that when checking289
this condition for the forward solution, its violation implies that all the other fundamental solutions are290
unstable. Therefore, stability of the forward solution, i.e., r(D¯Ω) < 1 directly implies determinacy and the291
forward solution is the determinate solution.7292
Building on these recent results, it is straightforward to verify whether a given model has stable fun-293
damental solutions. We rely on these techniques to deﬁne a reasonable compact parameter space for our294
estimation problem, in which it is likely that a stable RE equilibrium exists. To do so (and to aid our prac-295
tical estimation), an extensive study of the existence of RE equilibria for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations296
is conducted. The major ﬁndings are brieﬂy summarized here; Section B in the online appendix contains297
a detailed analysis. Essentially, a grid search over an extensive parameter range is run to verify whether298
the set of parameters for which a fundamental forward solution exists can be characterized. This proved a299
non-trivial task and no simple characterization is possible. However, the most critical parameters in driving300
the existence of a RE equilibrium clearly are (δ, µ, β1, β2). Recall that β1 > β2 is imposed, identifying the301
ﬁrst regime as the “active” regime. Not surprisingly, given Davig and Leeper’s work, an equilibrium can still302
exist with β2 smaller than 1, and β1 larger than 1. Values of µ and δ smaller than 0.5 lead to non-existence,303
but an equilibrium may exist if only one of the two is smaller than 0.5 (and the other one relatively high).304
This information is used to consider a restricted parameter space for the estimation (see more below).305
Nevertheless, estimating the model in equation (7) with a relatively large number of regime variables remains306
diﬃcult. In order to construct the likelihood function, we must not only integrate across all combinations of307
potential (unobserved) regimes, but also numerically compute the highly non-linear reduced-form coeﬃcient308
matrices (Ω(St) and Γ(St)) for all combinations of potential regimes. To circumvent this problem and309
simultaneously bring additional information to bear on the estimation, survey forecasts are incorporated, as310
is shown in the next subsection.311
2.4. Introducing survey expectations312
Undoubtedly, the information used by professional forecasters greatly exceeds the information set spanned313
by the variables present in the simple model in equations (1)-(3). Given that survey expectations outperform314
empirical and theoretical models predicting inﬂation, they can also prove useful in estimating macroeconomic315
6Notice that in the absence of regime switching, the argument matrices collapse to D¯Ω = Ω
2 and DF = F
2. But, since
r(Ω2) < 1 if and only if r(Ω) < 1, and the same is true for DF , the conditions in (11) are equivalent to those in (10). Therefore,
our determinacy conditions are a natural extension of those for linear models to MSRE models.
7While the determinacy conditions in linear (equation 10) and MSRE (equation 11) models appear analogous, the actual
derivations and proofs for the MSRE case are somewhat involved and further technical details are relegated to Section A in
the online appendix.
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parameters and dynamics. To incorporate SBE into the model, assume that survey expectations of inﬂation316
and output obey the following law of motion:317
πft = αEtπt+1 + (1− α)πft−1 + wπt (13)
yft = αEtyt+1 + (1 − α)yft−1 + wyt (14)
with wπt ∼ N
(
0, σπf
)
and wyt ∼ N
(
0, σyf
)
. Consequently, survey expectations potentially react to true318
rational expectations one for one if the exogenous parameter α equals 1, but may also slowly adjust to319
true rational expectations and depend on past survey expectations. This is reminiscent of Mankiw and320
Reis (2002)’s model of the Phillips curve, in which information disseminates slowly throughout the popula-321
tion. Our speciﬁcation is also in principle consistent with the slow and imperfect information updating of322
professional forecasters reported by Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) for the euro area.323
Our model combines the determination of SBE with the regime-switching counterparts of equations324
(1)-(3). That is, the assumption of rational expectations is retained, but additional information is used to325
identify both the structural parameters and the regimes in a 5 variable system. Nevertheless, the estimation326
remains complex as the rational expectations equilibrium must be solved at each step in the optimization327
and for all possible regime combinations. If the variance of the shocks in equations (13) and (14) goes to328
zero, SBE are an exact function of past SBE and current RE, and the estimation can be greatly simpliﬁed.329
In this case, inferring the RE of inﬂation and output from equations (13) and (14) and substituting them330
into the main model equations yields:331
πt =
δ
α
(πft − (1− α)πft−1) + (1− δ)πt−1 + λyt + π,t, (15)
yt =
µ
α
(yft − (1− α)yft−1) + (1 − µ)yt−1 − φit +
φ
α
(πft − (1 − α)πft−1) + y,t, (16)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[β(s
mp
t )
α
(πft − (1− α)πft−1) + γ(smpt )yt] + i,t, (17)
where π,t ∼ N(0, σ2π(sπt )), y,t ∼ N(0, σ2y(syt )) and i,t ∼ N(0, σ2i (sit)). Notice that when α = 1, the RE are332
assumed equivalent with SBE. The parameter α generally measures the relative weight of RE and past SBE333
in expectation formation for professional forecasters.334
Let Xft =
[
πft y
f
t
]′
. In matrix form, the regime-switching New-Keynesian model becomes:335
A(St)Xt = B(St)X
f
t +D(St)X
f
t−1 +GXt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (18)
with:
A(St) =
⎡
⎣ 1 −λ 00 1 φ
0 −(1− ρ)γ(smpt ) 1
⎤
⎦ , B(St) =
⎡
⎣ δα 0φ
α
µ
α
(1−ρ)
α β(s
mp
t ) 0
⎤
⎦ ,
D(St) =
⎡
⎢⎣ −
δ(1−α)
α 0
−φ(1−α)α −µ(1−α)α−(1−ρ)(1−α)
α β(s
mp
t ) 0
⎤
⎥⎦ , G =
⎡
⎣ (1− δ) 0 00 (1− µ) 0
0 0 ρ
⎤
⎦ ,
and conditional on α = 0,
Σ(St) =
⎡
⎣ σAS(sπt ) 0 00 σIS(syt ) 0
0 0 σMP (s
i
t)
⎤
⎦ .
This leads to the following reduced-form model:336
Xt = Ω1(St)X
f
t−1 +Ω2(St)X
f
t +Ω3(St)Xt−1 + Γ(St)t, t ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (19)
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with Ω1(St) = A(St)
−1B(St), Ω2(St) = A(St)−1D(St), Ω3(St) = A(St)−1G and Γ(St) = A(St)−1. A337
major advantage of this approach is that the matrices determining the law of motion of Xt are simple ana-338
lytical functions of the structural parameters, thus making the likelihood function much easier to compute,339
simplifying estimation. There is no need to compute the RE equilibrium at each step in the optimization340
of the likelihood, and the regimes can be inferred as in the standard reduced-form multivariate models (see341
Hamilton (1989) and Sims and Zha (2006)). Importantly, SBE adds new information, absent in the variables342
and structure of the New-Keynesian model, to aid parameter estimation.343
3. Data and Estimation344
The model requires analogs for ﬁve variables: inﬂation, the output gap, the short-term interest rate,345
and survey-based estimates of expected inﬂation and the expected output gap. Inﬂation is measured as the346
log-diﬀerence of the chain-type Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deﬂator price index. The output measure is347
real GDP and a quadratic trend is employed to measure potential output. The output gap is then deﬁned in348
the usual fashion as the percentage deviation of output relative to trend. The GDP and GDP deﬂator data349
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis database. Expected inﬂation is the median survey response of350
expected GDP inﬂation over the next quarter. The expected output gap is constructed from current GDP,351
the predicted trend, and expected GDP growth over the next quarter. The median survey response is used352
to proxy for expected GDP growth. Both expected inﬂation and output are from the Survey of Professional353
Forecasters (SPF) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Finally, the short-term interest354
rate is the 3-month Treasury bill (secondary market rate). The data frequency is quarterly and our sample355
period goes from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 2008.8356
The model in (19) is estimated via limited information maximum likelihood, given that the πft and y
f
t357
equations are not used. The information set It−1 consists of all the available information up to time t− 1:358
It−1 = {Qt−1, Qt−2, . . . , Q0}, where Qt = [Xt Xft ]′. The full dataset is thus Q˜T = [QT , QT−1, . . . , Q0]. De-359
note the parameters to be estimated as θ; so that the aim is to maximize the density function f(X˜T ; θ). While360
agents in the economy observe the regime variables, St, the econometrician does not and only has data on Q˜T .361
Therefore, the likelihood function for X˜T is maximized, integrating out the dependence on St, as is typical in362
the regime-switching literature9. In particular, note that the regime variable St can take on 16 values (2
4).363
The conditional likelihood at t can be rewritten as: f(Xt|It−1) =
∑16
i=1 P (St = i| It−1) f (Xt|It−1, St = i) .364
This decomposition allows evaluating the conditional density using equation (19). The regime dependent365
likelihoods are weighted by the so-called “ex-ante” regime probabilities, which can be easily created recur-366
sively, as described in Hamilton (1994). After identifying the parameters, the econometrician can make367
inferences about the regimes by computing the “smoothed” regime probabilities, which represent the prob-368
ability of the regime given full sample information IT = Q˜T . The well-known recursive algorithm developed369
in Kim (1994) and described in Hamilton (1994) is used to compute these probabilities. A well-identiﬁed370
regime switching model should produce smoothed regime probabilities that are either close to zero or close371
to one (see e.g. Ang and Bekaert (2002)). With two possible regimes, a smoothed regime probability of 0.5372
indicates the econometrician has failed to identify the regime.373
Ideally, the estimation produces parameters for which a fundamental rational expectations equilibrium374
exists. This is accomplished in two steps. First, based on the analysis of Section 2.3, a compact parameter375
space is constructed that attempts to exclude regions where REEs are unlikely to exist. Because of the376
non-convexity of the set, a rather wide parameter space is used (details are available upon request), that377
encompasses the parameter values yielding a REE. Second, at each step in the optimization, we verify378
whether the forward solution exists. If not, the likelihood function is penalized, steering optimization away379
from such regions in the parameter space.380
8Section C in the online appendix has more details on the data and the variables construction.
9We sacriﬁce full eﬃciency by ignoring f(Xft |It−1; θ) in the estimation. Technically, this requires assuming
f(Xft |St, It−1; θ) = f(Xft |It−1; θ). While not very palatable at ﬁrst, in our model, the regimes can in principle be identi-
ﬁed without using survey data, so that the assumption is implicitly valid.
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Several diﬀerent speciﬁcation tests on the residuals of the model are performed. First, for each equation,381
we test the hypotheses of a zero mean and zero serial correlation (up to two lags) of the residuals (the382
“mean test”); unit mean and zero serial correlation (two lags) for the squared standardized residuals (the383
“variance test”); zero skewness, and appropriate kurtosis. In performing these tests, it is recognized that384
the test statistics may be biased in small samples, especially if the data generating process is as non-linear385
as the model is above. Therefore, critical values from a small Monte Carlo analysis are used.10 Second, the386
economic model should also capture the correlation between the various variables, We test for each residual387
whether its joint covariances with all other residuals are indeed zero, and also perform a joint test for all388
covariances. As in the ﬁrst set of tests, critical values are based on a small Monte Carlo analysis.389
Table 1 reports Monte Carlo p-values of all these tests for our main model, on the left hand side. The390
residual levels and variances are well behaved, with the exception of the output gap, where the test uncovers391
some remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. The regime-switching model captures most skewness and392
kurtosis in the data, only failing the zero skewness test for inﬂation. The model’s weakest point appears to393
be the ﬁt of covariances between the three shocks. The last two lines in Table 1 reveal that the model fails394
to fully capture the correlation structure between the various economic variables.395
[Table 1 Here]396
4. Empirical Results397
This sections groups the empirical results in 6 sub-sections; it starts with a discussion of parameter esti-398
mates, then analyzes the various macro - and monetary policy regimes over time, analyzes the stability and399
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium, discusses impulse responses and provides a variance400
decomposition of macro variability during the sample. The ﬁnal sub-section shows the model results relaxing401
the rational expectations assumption.402
4.1. Parameter estimates403
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the Regime-Switching DSGE New-Keynesian macro model404
yielding a stable fundamental RE equilibrium, as described in Section 2.3. It also shows a number of405
statistical tests of parameter equality. All parameters have the right sign and are statistically signiﬁcant,406
but we did constrain the φ coeﬃcient to a positive value of 0.1. As is common in maximum likelihood407
estimation of this class of New-Keynesian models, unconstrained estimation yields either negative or very408
small and insigniﬁcant estimates of φ (see Ireland (2001), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and Cho and Moreno409
(2006))11.410
[Table 2 Here]411
In the AS equation, δ is 0.425, implying a similar weight on the forward-looking and endogenous per-412
sistence terms. The IS equation is more forward looking, since µ is 0.675. Given the small standard errors413
of these parameters, our estimation reveals strong evidence in favor of endogenous persistence. Moreover, a414
Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the degree of forward lookingness in the AS and IS equations415
can be captured with one coeﬃcient (Rudebusch (2001); Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)).416
The Phillips curve parameter λ is large at 0.102, implying a strong transmission mechanism from output417
to inﬂation and thus a strong monetary policy transmission mechanism. Previous estimations of rational418
expectations models fail to obtain reasonable and signiﬁcant estimates of λ with quarterly data (Fuhrer and419
Moore (1995)). Some alternative estimations have yielded signiﬁcant estimates, such as Gal´ı and Gertler420
(1999) who use a measure for marginal cost replacing the output gap; Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010)421
who identify a natural rate of output process from term structure data; or Roberts (1995) and Adam and422
Padula (2011) who use SBE but in a single equation context with ﬁxed regimes. However, our estimate423
is even larger than the coeﬃcients reported in these articles. We conjecture that the introduction of slow424
moving SBE of inﬂation generates additional correlation between (expected) inﬂation and the output gap.425
10Section D in the online appendix describes our speciﬁcation tests and the Monte Carlo analysis.
11Our results are qualitatively similar when we set φ = 0.01 or φ = 0.20.
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Regarding the monetary policy rule, the interest rate persistence is large, 0.834, in agreement with426
most studies in the literature (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010), among427
others). Our estimation allows for regime switches in the key monetary policy parameters, β, the response428
to expected inﬂation, and γ, the response to the output gap. In the “activist” regime, which is the ﬁrst429
regime, β is 2.312, well above 1 statistically, whereas in the passive regime, β is 0.598, signiﬁcantly below 1.430
Thus, our estimation clearly identiﬁes a sharp economic and statistical diﬀerence in the response to inﬂation431
across monetary policy regimes. In their single equation monetary policy rule estimation, Davig and Leeper432
(2005) also estimate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between β’s across regimes, but of a smaller magnitude than433
our estimates. The contemporaneous articles of Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and Bianchi (2013), estimating434
MSRE New-Keynesian models, also identify a large diﬀerence in β across regimes. The interest rate response435
to the output gap, γ, is higher than in the aforementioned estimations (1.187 and 0.687, respectively), and436
it is larger in the more “activist” regime relative to the passive regime, although not in a statistically437
signiﬁcant way. To sum up, the novel combination of a regime-switching DSGE system estimation with438
survey expectations produces signiﬁcantly diﬀerent systematic monetary policy regimes and a strong interest439
rate transmission mechanism in a single estimation.440
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations, is 0.986, mean-441
ing that SBE adjust almost completely to RE. We examine below whether this ﬁnding is the result of442
imposing rational expectations on the estimation. Because the other parameters are directly related to the443
identiﬁcation of the regimes, they are discussed in the next sub-section.444
4.2. Macroeconomic regimes445
The key output of our model is the identiﬁcation of macroeconomic regimes. The volatility parameters446
imply strong evidence of time-varying variances in macroeconomic shocks. For the output gap and inﬂation447
shocks, volatility in the high volatility regime is around double that in the low volatility regime. However,448
for interest rates, the high volatility regime features volatility that is about 6 times as high as in quiet449
times, suggesting a potentially important role for discretionary monetary policy. Because interest rates are450
measured in quarterly percent, the volatility of interest rate shocks in the low volatility state is very small451
(0.04%), implying a strict commitment to the monetary policy rule.452
The transition probability coeﬃcients imply overall quite persistent regimes. For inﬂation, the expected453
duration of the high variance regime is very high at 100 quarters, but the low variance regime is persistent454
as well. Output gap regimes are somewhat less persistent, with the high variance regime expected to last455
about 27 quarters, while discretionary interest rate regimes are much less persistent, with the high interest456
rate variability regime expected to last about 8 quarters. Accommodating monetary policy regimes last on457
average longer than activist regimes, which are short-lived lasting on average 7 quarters.458
These transition probabilities are important inputs in the identiﬁcation of the time path of the regimes.459
Figure 1 plots the smoothed probabilities for the four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the460
smoothed probabilities of respectively the high inﬂation shock volatility regime and the high output shock461
volatility regime. Note that the regime probabilities tend to be either close to one or zero, indicating adequate462
regime identiﬁcation. A sudden drop in output shock volatility starts in 1981 and fully materializes in 1985.463
The decreased volatility persists until 2007, coinciding with the onset of the credit crisis. The variability of464
inﬂation shocks starts to decrease later, with the smoothed probability going below 0.5 at the beginning of465
1986, and going toward zero just before the 1990 recession. Signs of a reversal in the low variability regime466
are already visible in 2003, with its probability reaching less than 50 percent in the third quarter of 2006467
already. Our evidence in favor of a switch towards a higher variability regime is stronger and its timing468
earlier than in Bikbov and Chernov (2013).469
[Figure 1 Here]470
Panel B shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy regime in which the471
Fed aggressively stabilizes inﬂation, and the high volatility regime for interest rate shocks. The high interest472
rate shock volatility regime occurs quite frequently and is always on during recessions, including during473
the 1980-1982 Volcker period. This implies that in times of recession, the Fed is more willing to deviate474
from the interest rate rule. Bikbov and Chernov (2013) also categorize the Volcker period as a period of475
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discretionary monetary policy. Unlike their results, we also ﬁnd systematic monetary policy to be activist476
during this period. Interestingly, our model shows that activist monetary policy spells generally became477
more frequent from 1980 onwards. The 1993-2000 period is identiﬁed as an accommodating monetary policy478
stance. Because this period is characterized by relatively low inﬂation, a passive monetary policy stance479
implies relatively high interest rates. One interpretation is that inﬂation expectations were ﬁrmly anchored,480
due to the more aggressive stance of the Fed during the previous decade. In addition, the possibility of481
switching back to the stabilizing regime, as captured by our regime-switching DSGE, may also anchor482
inﬂation expectations. Notice that this regime identiﬁcation is quite diﬀerent from the permanent shift483
in monetary policy around 1980, put forward in earlier studies such as Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)484
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), but consistent with contemporaneous results in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,485
Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010).486
In 2000 there is a switch to the activist regime, as interest rates rapidly declined following the beginning487
of the 2000 recession, while inﬂation stayed low. Hence, according to our analysis, interest rates in the ﬁrst488
5 years of the previous decade were lower than what was prescribed by the Taylor rule (see Taylor (2009)).489
Bernanke (2010) ascribes this to the “jobless recovery” experienced at the time, but some may surmise that490
this aggressive monetary policy was one of the root causes of the recent credit crisis (see Rajan (2006),491
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013)). The recent credit crisis starting in 2007 is preceded by a passive492
monetary policy regime which, given the low inﬂation environment, implies that interest rates increased. In493
the beginning of the credit crunch, our model identiﬁes a switch towards an (expansionary) discretionary494
monetary policy, whereas the probability of a systematic stabilizing policy also increases, leading to a sharp495
decline in interest rates.496
4.3. Stability and Determinacy under Rational Expectations497
We now compute the forward solution of the model to determine a fundamental solution consistent with498
the transversality condition, and examine determinacy under rational expectations. The forward solution499
has the form of equation (8) without ut, and the coeﬃcient matrices Ω and Γ are given by:500
Ω (smpt = 1) =
⎡
⎣ 0.884 0.067 −0.198−0.061 0.391 −0.424
0.272 0.102 0.610
⎤
⎦ , Ω (smpt = 2) =
⎡
⎣ 1.184 0.093 −0.6260.480 0.444 −1.161
0.186 0.062 0.583
⎤
⎦
Γ (smpt = 1) =
⎡
⎣ 1.537 0.206 −0.238−0.106 1.204 −0.510
0.474 0.312 0.732
⎤
⎦ , Γ (smpt = 2) =
⎡
⎣ 2.060 0.286 −0.7510.834 1.366 −1.393
0.323 0.190 0.699
⎤
⎦
Note that the volatility regime variables do not aﬀect these coeﬃcient matrices. Γ (smpt ) governs the initial501
responses of the structural shocks to the variables. For instance, inﬂation and the output gap fall following502
a contractionary monetary policy shock (see third column of each Γ). In the case of a positive inﬂation503
shock, if the initial stance of monetary policy is active (smpt = 1), the output gap falls and inﬂation rises.504
However, when the policy is passive, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate less than one for one,505
reducing the real interest rate. This actually raises the output gap as the (2, 1)-th component of Γ (smpt = 2)506
is positive.507
While the long run Taylor principle argument of Davig and Leeper (2007) indicates that a passive508
monetary policy can be admissible as a determinate equilibrium, our estimated system may be indeterminate509
as the parameter β2 in the passive regime is 0.598, signiﬁcantly less than 1. Employing the numerical search510
method of Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) shows that multiple stable solutions exist to our estimated511
model, leading to indeterminacy. This implies that monetary policy could have ensured determinacy, had512
it been less passive for our sample period. Hence, it is important to quantify the degree of passiveness513
admissible for determinacy. For this task, we resort to Cho (2014), who develops very tractable determinacy514
conditions for MSRE models (see Section 2.3, equation (11)).515
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We now analyze what combinations of policy parameters, β1 and β2, satisfy these determinacy condi-516
tions, holding other parameters ﬁxed. Figure 2 plots our determinacy and indeterminacy regions. Clearly,517
the policy stance in our MSRE model can be temporarily passive, and still yield a determinate equilib-518
rium; however, it cannot be too passive. Indeed, r(D¯Ω) = 0.775 and r(DF ) = 1.25 at our our parameter519
estimates, implying that our equilibrium is outside the determinacy region. Recall that the passive policy520
stance prevailed in the pre-Volcker era and for more than half of the post-Volcker regime. Reﬂecting this521
fact, our estimate of β2 is low, namely 0.598, putting the model in the indeterminacy region. To ensure522
determinacy, β2 should be greater than 0.936. Several articles have identiﬁed spells of passive monetary523
policy before (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010), Bianchi (2013)) but524
our article is the ﬁrst to characterize determinacy and show that recent passive policy stances result in an525
overall indeterminate MSRE equilibrium for the US economy. When varying other estimated parameter526
values, the determinacy region is not much aﬀected, except when ρ is varied. When ρ becomes relatively527
large, determinacy requires both policy regimes to be active if one regime is too active relative to the other.528
[Figure 2 Here]529
4.4. Impulse responses530
There are three independent structural shocks in the model (see t in equation (19)). A nice feature of531
our model is that the impulse responses are regime-dependent, and should diﬀer across regimes. Because532
agents are assumed to know the regime, we compute the impulse responses using an information set that533
incorporates both data and the regime; they follow from calculating E [Xt+k|It, smpt = i], for i = 1, 2.12534
Note that this computation takes into account the expectations of agents regarding future switches in the535
monetary policy regime.536
Figures 3 and 4 produce these regime dependent impulse responses of all three macro-variables to one-537
standard deviation shocks, focusing on, respectively, AS and monetary policy shocks. In each ﬁgure, there538
are three panels corresponding to the three macro-variables, each showing 4 diﬀerent impulse responses,539
depending on the monetary policy regime and the shock volatility regime. While the volatility regimes only540
aﬀect the initial size of the shock, the relative magnitude of the impulse responses helps us interpret macroe-541
conomic dynamics in diﬀerent time periods. For IS shocks, we do not produce a ﬁgure. The inﬂation/output542
gap responses to IS shocks are similar across monetary policy regimes, likely because monetary policy reacts543
similarly to demand shocks across both regimes.544
[Figure 3 Here]545
Figure 3, focusing on AS shocks, can help us determine whether the stagﬂations of the seventies were546
partially policy driven, the topic of a lively debate. The ﬁgure shows that following an AS shock, inﬂation is547
highest in the high inﬂation shock volatility - passive monetary policy regime, as was observed in the 1970s,548
and lowest in the low inﬂation shock volatility - activist monetary policy regime, as observed from 1985 to549
1993. It is especially activist monetary policy that contributes to a lower inﬂation response. Investigating550
output gap responses, a positive AS shock drives down the output gap in a protracted way under an activist551
monetary policy response, because the real interest rate increases. However, the output gap increases when552
monetary policy is accommodating as then the real interest rate decreases following a positive AS shock.553
However, after about 6-7 quarters, the output gap is lower under an accommodating regime than it is under554
an activist regime. The eﬀect of AS shocks on nominal interest rates is also strikingly regime-dependent.555
Except for the initial periods, the accommodating regime yields higher nominal interest rate responses than556
the activist regime. This is because under accommodating monetary policy, it takes time for inﬂation to557
decrease - both through the direct eﬀect of monetary policy and through expectations -, so that interest rates558
must be kept high for a long time. The regime-dependent responses therefore provide simultaneously an559
interesting interpretation of the historical record on the macroeconomic response to the negative aggregate560
supply shocks in the seventies and a counter-factual analysis. The accommodating policy regime implied561
(excessively) high interest rates, high inﬂation, and a substantial long term loss in output. The responses562
under an activist regime show that an aggressive Fed could have likely lowered the magnitude of the inﬂation563
12Section E in the online appendix describes a simple procedure to compute these impulse responses recursively.
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response, reduced inﬂation volatility, kept interest rates overall lower and avoided the longer-term output564
loss, at the cost of a short-term loss over the ﬁrst 5 quarters.565
Figure 4 shows the responses to the monetary policy shock. Clearly, the activist monetary policy regime566
implies (much) more stable inﬂation and output dynamics than the passive regime. The macroeconomic567
volatility under the accommodating regime is especially dramatic when the interest rate shock is in the568
high volatility regime (recall that the interest rate shock volatility is multiple times higher in that case). A569
contractionary monetary policy shock lowers inﬂation and the output gap in both regimes, but, as the third570
panel shows, this is not only accommodated with less macroeconomic but also less interest rate volatility in571
the activist regime.572
[Figure 4 Here]573
4.5. Macro-variability and its Sources574
US economic history has witnessed profound changes in the volatility of macroeconomic variables over575
time, as evidenced by the literature on the Great Moderation. In the context of our model, this time variation576
in macroeconomic variability is driven by changing regimes in the variability of macroeconomic shocks (driven577
by sπt , s
y
t , s
i
t) and regime dependent feedback parameters, which depend on the monetary policy regime, s
mp
t .578
In this section, the unconditional and regime-dependent variances of our macro variables are derived, and579
various decompositions provided to shed light on the sources of macroeconomic variability.580
4.5.1. A Variance Decomposition581
The regime variable St contains 16 diﬀerent regimes, as each of the four independent regimes, s
mp
t , s
π
t ,582
syt and s
i
t has two states. The unconditional variance can be computed in the following way:583
V ar(Xt) =
S∑
i=1
V ar(Xt|St = i) · Pi (20)
where Pi = Pr(St = i) is the unconditional, ergodic regime probability, V ar(Xt|St = i) is the regime-584
dependent variance, and S = 16.13 The contribution of a particular regime to the total variance is then585
computed as:586
rx(St = i) =
V ar(xt|St = i)Pi
V ar(xt)
(21)
where xt represents πt, yt or it.587
Table 3 reports these ratios together with the long run, ergodic distribution (Pi). For instance, the regime588
combination of an active monetary policy and high shock volatility across all three equations contributes589
1.24, 1.98 and 3.17% to the total variance of inﬂation, the output gap and the interest rate, respectively.590
The regimes contributing the most to the unconditional variance reﬂect passive monetary policy, the high591
variability regime for inﬂation shocks and the low variability regime for output shocks. The latter is true592
because the low variability regime for output occurs more frequently than the high variability regime (69.81%593
versus 30.19% in fact), whereas the opposite is true for inﬂation shocks, where the high variability regime594
occurs 68.97% of the time and also for interest rate shocks where the high variability regime occurs 59.47%595
of the time.596
[Table 3 Here]597
The most noticeable result is that in all cases, the contribution to total variance of any variable is598
much smaller under the active monetary regime than it is under the passive regime. For instance, when599
the economy is in the high volatility regime for all shocks, the active regime contributes only 1.98% to the600
total variance of the output gap, whereas the passive regime contributes 14.31%, about 7.23 times more.601
Of course, the contribution could simply be low because the active regime has a much lower probability of602
occurring. In the high volatility regimes, the ergodic probability of the active regime is 3.23% while it is603
13Section F in the online appendix derives closed-form expressions for the regime-dependent variances.
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9.16% under the passive regime, about three times higher. Therefore, even after controlling for diﬀerences604
in ergodic probabilities, the volatility of the output gap under the active regime is much smaller than that605
under the passive regime. This is generally true for all regime combinations and all the macro-variables.606
To see this more explicitly, the numbers in brackets show variance ratios for the various regimes,607
V ar(xt|St = i)/V ar(xt), that is the variance in that particular regime relative to the unconditional variance.608
Strikingly, the variance ratio for output and inﬂation variability in the active regime when all the shocks609
are in the high variability regime is lower than the variance ratio for the output and inﬂation variability in610
the passive regime when all the shocks are in the low variability regime. This suggests that the monetary611
policy regime has a rather important impact on macro-variability and perhaps an impact that exceeds the612
impact of the variability of macro shocks. In fact, when taking ratios of the numbers on the right (passive613
regime) to the numbers on the left (active regime), the passive monetary policy regime leads to variances of614
inﬂation and the output gap that are about two to ﬁve times as large as their variances in the active regime.615
To quantify the eﬀect of the variability of shocks, the last line of Table 3 shows the ratio of the variance616
in a regime where all macro shocks are in the high variability regime versus the variance of a regime where617
all the macro shocks are in the low variability regime. These ratios obviously depend on the macro variable618
and the policy regime, but their range is rather narrow varying between 2.30 and 2.87. It is obvious that619
policy has a relatively larger eﬀect on output and inﬂation variances than do macro shocks.620
4.5.2. The Great Moderation621
The above computations can also help us identify the start and the end of the Great Moderation.622
We deﬁne the Great Moderation as a period in which the time-varying variance is substantially below its623
unconditional counterpart. At each point of time, agents in the economy know the regime (and hence the624
variance), but we can only estimate the probabilities of diﬀerent regimes occurring using the data. The625
variance at each point in time is therefore estimated as the sum of the regime-dependent variances weighted626
by their associated time-varying smoothed regime probabilities using full sample information. That is,627
V̂ ar(Xt) =
S∑
i=1
V ar[Xt|St = i]P [St = i|IT ] (22)
If regime classiﬁcation is perfect (that is, the smoothed probabilities are zero or 1), the summation simply628
selects one of the 16 regime-dependent variances.629
Figure 5 graphs the ratio of this estimate of the time-varying variance relative to the unconditional630
variance for inﬂation, the output gap and interest rates. Visually, the graph clearly identiﬁes the Great631
Moderation lasting from the third quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2007, with inﬂation and output632
variability being substantially below the 1 line, often even being less than 50% of the unconditional variance.633
Do note that there are short episodes during the Great Moderation where inﬂation and particularly output634
variability brieﬂy spike up.635
[Figure 5 Here]636
Our previous computations suggest that policy played a rather important role in the Great Moderation.637
For example, it is striking that we identify the Great Moderation to start before the shock variabilities move638
to a lower variability regime. This is, of course, due to a switch from a passive to active monetary policy639
regime around 1980. To visualize the eﬀect of policy on macro-variances, a counterfactual analysis is run.640
Figure 6 displays a volatility ratio, namely the standard deviation of the three macro variables, conditional on641
the monetary policy regime always being in the passive regime versus the actual time-varying volatility, that642
is, the square root of the variance computed in equation (22). When computing the counterfactual volatility,643
the underlying variance computation transfers mass from states where smpt = 1 to the corresponding state644
(and its variance) where smpt = 2. Figure 7 does the opposite computation, it computes the volatility645
assuming the monetary policy regime is always activist, and graphs the ratio of the actual over the activist646
volatility.14647
14Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the counterfactual probability measure of permanently passive monetary policy regime as Pˆ (St =
16
[Figure 6 Here]648
[Figure 7 Here]649
With these two graphs in hand, the historical evolution of macro-volatility as generated by our model650
can be reinterpreted. In the seventies, macro-volatility was around twice as high as it could have been,651
had monetary policy been active (see Figure 7). From 1981 to 1993, active monetary policy managed to652
reduce macro-volatility substantially - it would have been 50% to 200% higher otherwise (Figure 6). The653
relatively subdued macro-variability after 1993 to around 2000 was due to low variability in the macro654
shocks, as monetary policy was passive. Of course, as argued before, the earlier aggressive policy stance655
may have helped anchor expectations during a rather mild macroeconomic climate. Taking our model656
literally, monetary policy could have further reduced macro-volatility by continuing to be aggressive. Because657
inﬂation was low at that time, an active monetary policy would have meant lower interest rates. The jump658
in counterfactual volatility around 2000 in Figure 6 is the more dramatic of the two graphs. In other words,659
if monetary policy had remained passive, macro-volatilities would have increased substantially. Bernanke’s660
(2010) speech explicitly discusses this episode as the Federal Reserve reacting aggressively to a deﬂation scare,661
reducing the interest rate way below what a standard Taylor rule would predict. The period also witnessed662
a number of macroeconomic shocks that could have caused macro-volatility to increase and augmented663
recession risk, such as the events of September 11, 2001.664
4.6. Rational expectations versus survey expectations665
Our estimation imposes a parameter space that ensures the existence of a fundamental rational ex-666
pectations equilibrium. What happens if this assumption is relaxed? Table 4 shows the results for the667
unconstrained estimation. In Table 1, the right-hand side panel also produces speciﬁcation tests for this668
model. The model only performs marginally better than the constrained model. Moreover, the resulting669
estimates imply explosive dynamics for the RE model. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the parameter670
estimates are very similar to those obtained in the constrained estimation. The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence671
is that µ, the forward-looking parameter in the IS equation, is now signiﬁcantly smaller, 0.331, relative to672
0.675 before. This is similar to the values obtained by Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004), in their systematic673
single equation estimation in a ﬁxed regime context. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) also estimate a lower674
value for µ, namely 0.422, but this is coupled with a high estimate for the degree of forward-looking behavior675
in the AS equation (δ in our model). Simulation exercises conﬁrm that the combination of low δ and low µ676
- maintaining standard values for other parameters - implies the non-existence of a stable RE equilibrium,677
both in a ﬁxed regime and in a multiple regime context. In economic terms, stable RE dynamics require AS678
and IS equations with a suﬃcient degree of forward looking behavior, such that shocks are rapidly absorbed.679
[Table 4 Here]680
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations, is 0.410 in the681
unconstrained case, whereas it was 0.986 in the constrained estimation. This is an important diﬀerence.682
When enforcing a stable RE, RE appear indistinguishable from SBE, whereas in the unconstrained esti-683
mation, SBE slowly adjust to RE, being heavily inﬂuenced by past expectations. In fact, α is statistically684
indistinguishable from 0.5, implying that rational expectations and past survey-based expectations obtain685
similar relative weights in the expectations formation process. In other words, viewed through the lens of686
this macroeconomic model, survey expectations only slowly adjust to rational expectations, being heavily687
inﬂuenced by past expectations. This is consistent with Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004), who show that688
the adjustment of SBE to the macro environment is gradual. Conversely, the dependence on rational ex-689
pectations is highly signiﬁcant, implying that survey expectations likely convey much information, useful in690
estimating macroeconomic parameters and dynamics.691
i|Passive, IT ) where Pˆ (smpt = 1, j, k, l|IT ) = 0 and Pˆ (smpt = 2, j, k, l|IT ) = P (smpt = 1, j, k, l|IT ) +P (smpt = 2, j, k, l|IT ) for all
sπt = j, s
y
t = k, s
i
t = l, j, k, l = 1, 2. Using this probability measure, the time-varying variance of the policy being always passive
is deﬁned as V̂ ar[Xt|Passive]. The counterfactual activist probability measure and activist variance are deﬁned analogously.
Figures 6 and 7 depict respectively
√
V̂ ar[Xt|Passive]√
V̂ ar(Xt)
and
√
V̂ ar(Xt)√
V̂ ar[Xt|Active]
.
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Figure 8 shows the regime probabilities for the unconstrained model, which should be compared to692
Figure 1 for the RE model. Focusing ﬁrst on Panel B, the monetary policy regime identiﬁcation, both for693
systematic and discretionary policy is very similar, qualitatively and quantitatively, to that in the constrained694
estimation. Panel A reveals some diﬀerences in terms of output shock regime identiﬁcation. First, the high695
output volatility prevails from the beginning of the sample, whereas in the constrained estimation this696
regime appears more gradually. In addition, the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility shocks697
starts abruptly around 1986, which is a few years later than in the constrained estimation. Second, the low698
volatility output shock regime already ends in 2000, much earlier than in the constrained optimization. These699
diﬀerences can be easily understood examining the transition probabilities of the IS shock regime variable700
across estimations (see Tables 2 and 4). The unconstrained estimation shows much more persistence in the701
high variance regime and less persistence in the low volatility regime than the constrained estimation.702
[Figure 8 Here]703
To sum up, when relaxing the assumption of RE, α is statistically diﬀerent from 1, implying SBE that704
load heavily on past SBE. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates, model dynamics and regime identiﬁcation705
are similar in this model to what they were in the RE equilibrium.706
5. Conclusion707
This article identiﬁed macroeconomic regimes through the lens of a simple New-Keynesian model accom-708
modating regime switches in macroeconomic shocks and systematic monetary policy. Monetary policy has709
witnessed several spells of activist policy, which have become more frequent post 1980, but there is no710
permanent switch from accommodating to activist policy around 1980. One reason is that the data suggest711
an important and time-varying role for discretionary monetary policy. For example, the Volcker period is712
characterized by both activist systematic policy and discretionary active policy. Important changes also713
occur in the variances of output and volatility shocks. It is no surprise that a “shock variability modera-714
tion” occurs around 1985 for output, whereas for inﬂation the timing is somewhere between 1985 and 1990.715
What is new is that we ﬁnd strong evidence of this volatility reduction having ended, for output at the716
onset of the recent economic crisis (more precisely in 2007), for inﬂation, earlier, in 2005. The variability717
of shocks is not the only determinant of macro-variability however. Our model implies that the eﬀect of718
monetary policy regimes on macro variability is relatively larger than the eﬀect of the variability of shocks.719
Investigating the time path of the overall variability of inﬂation and the output gap, the Great Moderation720
starts around 1980 and ends in about 2007. During that period, a predominantly active monetary policy721
and low variability economic shocks combined to make output and inﬂation substantially less variable than722
unconditional averages would suggest.723
Estimating a rational expectations New-Keynesian model with regime switches is diﬃcult from a numeri-724
cal perspective. Our innovation was to expand the information set with survey expectations on inﬂation and725
output growth. Formulating a simple law of motion for these expectations as a function of the true rational726
expectations greatly simpliﬁed the likelihood construction. When constraining the parameter space to those727
parameters that yield a stable rational expectations equilibrium, survey expectations are almost equivalent728
to rational expectations. However, when these constraints are relaxed, survey expectations only gradually729
adjust to rational expectations and the parameters are outside the rational expectations equilibrium space.730
Fortunately, the identiﬁcation of regimes remains similar to that obtained in the rational expectations model,731
except that the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility ends much earlier (in 2000!) when identiﬁed732
from the unconstrained model.733
There are two possible interpretations to these diﬀerent estimation results. One possibility is that734
agents truly have rational expectations but that our New-Keynesian model is misspeciﬁed. Perhaps, a735
more intricate natural rate of output process or investment equations as in Smets and Wouters (2007) are736
needed to better ﬁt the data. We did experiment with slightly more complex speciﬁcations (e.g. alternative737
characterizations of the monetary policy rule, alternative values for state-dependent transition probabilities,738
correlated regimes) within the conﬁnes of the stylized New-Keynesian model, ﬁnding little improvement in739
ﬁt, and no noteworthy new results. Perhaps some of the parameters assumed to be time-invariant in our740
model may also be unstable. For example, a number of recent articles including Benati (2008), Hofmann,741
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Peersman, and Straub (2012), and Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011)) have raised the possibility of an unstable742
AS equation, for instance because the degree of price and/or wage indexation changes through time.15 An743
alternative possibility is that the assumption of rational expectations is too rigid. In any case, we hope this744
article stimulates the use of survey expectations in building and estimating macroeconomic models.745
15Some preliminary analysis did not reveal any evidence in favor of switches in δ, the parameter governing the degree of
forward looking behavior in the AS equation.
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Table 1: Speciﬁcation Tests on Model Residuals
This table reports Monte-Carlo p-values for the diﬀerent speciﬁcation tests described in Section D in the online
appendix. For both the Rational Expectations and Unconstrained Model, the univariate tests test for a zero mean,
no second order autocorrelation, zero skewness, and no excess kurtosis in the standardized residuals of the output,
inﬂation, and interest rate equations. The bottom panel reports Monte-Carlo p-values for a test of zero covariances
of the factor shocks of one state variable with the factor shocks of the other two state variables, as well as a joint
test that all covariances are equal to zero.
Rational Expectations Model Unconstrained Model
Univariate Tests Output Inﬂation Short Rate Output Inﬂation Short Rate
Mean Test
Zero mean 0.560 0.855 0.905 0.377 0.559 0.807
Autocorrelation 0.000 0.930 0.926 0.000 0.119 0.839
Joint 0.000 0.985 0.976 0.000 0.250 0.933
Variance Test
Unit Variance 0.771 0.684 0.907 0.294 0.552 0.743
Autocorrelation 0.057 0.739 0.485 0.907 0.502 0.504
Joint 0.382 0.845 0.451 0.771 0.536 0.208
Test on Higher Moments
Zero Skewness 0.221 0.033 0.281 0.365 0.450 0.433
Zero Excess Kurtosis 0.861 0.251 0.643 0.853 0.480 0.694
Covariance Tests
Covar shocks with other 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.001 0.000 0.038
Joint 0.000 0.000
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates Rational Expectations Model
This table reports the estimation results of the Rational Expectations Model with independent regimes in respectively
the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inﬂation shocks ASt , the volatility of output shocks ISt ,
and the volatility of monetary policy shocks MPt , as outlined in Section 2. The regime-switching variables are
respectively denoted as smpt , s
π
t , s
y
t , and s
i
t. Panel 1 reports the parameters of the AS and IS equation. Panel 2
reports the monetary policy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching volatilities of respectively the inﬂation
shocks (σAS (s
π
t )), the output shocks (σIS (s
y
t )), and the interest rate shocks (σMP (s
i
t)) (on a quarterly basis). Panel
4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent regime-switching variables. Panel 5 reports the alpha
parameter. Standard errors are reported between parentheses. For the regime-switching parameters, we also report
p-values for a Wald test of equality across regimes between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.425 0.102 0.675 0.100
(0.065) (0.044) (0.030) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(s
mp
t = 2) γ(s
mp
t = 1) γ(s
mp
t = 2)
0.834 2.312 0.598 1.187 0.687
(0.022) (0.182) (0.140) (0.414) (0.111)
[0.001] [0.217]
3. Volatilities
σAS(s
π
t = 1) σAS(s
π
t = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP (s
i
t = 1) σMP (s
i
t = 2)
0.334 0.162 0.142 0.072 0.249 0.041
(0.051) (0.044) (0.031) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
π
11 P
π
22 α
0.878 0.957 0.991 0.980 0.986
(0.108) (0.036) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020)
P y11 P
y
22 P (s
i
t) Q(s
i
t)
0.963 0.984 0.893 0.843
(0.047) (0.015) (0.045) (0.057)
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Table 3: Variance Decompositions and Ergodic Distribution for all Regimes
This table reports the ergodic distribution and the variance decomposition results. In the ﬁrst and sixth columns, A
and P stand for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy regimes. H and L stand for ‘high’ and ‘low’ volatility regimes
for supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, respectively. The 2nd and 7th columns show the probability of
each regime in the ergodic distribution, which measures the unconditional probability of each regime combination.
The 3rd through 5th, and 8th through 10th columns report the ratio of the variance of each variable conditional
on a regime combination to its total variance, in percent. That is, all columns add up to 100. Within brackets, we
show the ratio of the variance of a given variable (π: inﬂation, y: output gap and i: interest rate) conditional on a
given regime to the unconditional variance of that variable implied by the model. Each regime combines systematic
monetary policy (A: active, P: passive) and regime shock size for the three shocks (H: high, L: low). In the last line,
we divide the ratio of the all-high-shock regime by the all-low-shock regime, for both active and passive monetary
policy regimes.
(smpt ,s
π
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) Pi rπ ry ri (s
mp
t ,s
π
t , s
y
t , s
i
t) Pi rπ ry ri
(A, H, H, H), 3.23 1.24 1.98 3.17 (P, H, H, H) 9.16 14.24 14.31 12.08
(0.38) (0.61) (0.98) (1.56) (1.56) (1.32)
(A, H, H, L) 2.20 0.79 1.23 1.96 (P, H, H, L) 6.24 8.61 6.52 7.51
(0.36) (0.56) (0.89) (1.38) (1.05) (1.20)
(A, H, L, H) 7.46 2.86 4.35 7.26 (P, H, L, H) 21.17 32.89 32.18 27.83
(0.38) (0.58) (0.97) (1.55) (1.52) (1.31)
(A, H, L, L) 5.09 1.82 2.68 4.50 (P, H, L, L) 14.43 19.88 14.46 17.30
(0.36) (0.52) (0.88) (1.38) (1.00) (1.20)
(A, L, H, H) 1.45 0.24 0.50 0.71 (P, L, H, H) 4.12 3.25 4.56 2.86
(0.17) (0.34) (0.49) (0.79) (1.11) (0.69)
(A, L, H, L) 0.99 0.14 0.28 0.40 (P, L, H, L) 2.81 1.72 1.65 1.62
(0.14) (0.29) (0.40) (0.61) (0.59) (0.58)
(A, L, L, H) 3.36 0.55 1.05 1.62 (P, L, L, H) 9.53 7.49 10.13 6.56
(0.16) (0.31) (0.48) (0.79) (1.06) (0.69)
(A, L, L, L) 2.29 0.32 0.59 0.90 (P, L, L, L) 6.49 3.96 3.54 3.72
(0.14) (0.26) (0.39) (0.61) (0.55) (0.57)
(H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 2.76 2.39 2.48 (H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 2.55 2.87 2.30
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Unconstrained Regime-Switching Macro Model
This table reports the estimation results of the unrestricted New-Keynesian Model with independent regimes in
respectively the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inﬂation shocks ASt , the volatility of output
shocks ISt , and the volatility of monetary policy shocks MPt , as outlined in Section 2. The regime-switching
variables are respectively denoted as smpt , s
π
t , s
y
t , and s
i
t. Panel 1 reports the parameters of the AS and IS
equation. Panel 2 reports the monetary policy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching volatilities of
respectively the inﬂation shocks (σAS (s
π
t )), the output shocks (σIS(s
y
t )), and the interest rate shocks (σMP (s
i
t)) (on
a quarterly basis). Panel 4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent regime-switching variables.
Panel 5 reports the alpha parameter. Standard errors are reported between parentheses. For the regime-switching
parameters, we also report p-values for a Wald test of equality across regimes between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.351 0.076 0.331 0.100
(0.070) (0.031) (0.048) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(s
mp
t = 2) γ(s
mp
t = 1) γ(s
mp
t = 2)
0.871 2.164 0.210 1.335 0.748
(0.020) (0.250) (0.192) (0.328) (0.138)
3. Volatilities
σAS(s
π
t = 1) σAS(s
π
t = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP (s
i
t = 1) σMP (s
i
t = 2)
0.316 0.137 0.092 0.050 0.253 0.038
(0.034) (0.026) (0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.004)
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
π
11 P
π
22 α
0.841 0.936 0.990 0.973 0.410
(0.095) (0.032) (0.011) (0.024) (0.066)
P y11 P
y
22 P
i
11 P
i
22
0.973 0.959 0.891 0.837
(0.080) (0.116) (0.057) (0.061)
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Figure 1: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Rational Expectations Model)
This ﬁgure shows the smoothed probabilities of the regimes in the general regime-switching New-Keynesian Macro
model with four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the high
inﬂation shock volatility regime and the high output shock volatility regime. Panel B shows the smoothed proba-
bilities of respectively the active monetary policy regime, and the high interest rate shock volatility regime. NBER
recessions are shaded gray.
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Figure 2: Determinacy and Indeterminacy Regions under Rational Expectations
This ﬁgure shows the determinacy/indeterminacy regions of our MS DSGE implied by diﬀerent values of the two
regime-dependent interest rate responses to expected inﬂation. The remaining parameters are set at their estimated
values.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to AS Shocks
This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses of inﬂation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate to the AS
shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses of each variable dependent
on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents the estimated stabilizing (accommodating)
monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to MP Shocks
This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses of inﬂation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate to the MP
shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses of each variable dependent
on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents the estimated stabilizing (accommodating)
monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 5: Time-Varying Variances relative to Unconditional Variances
This ﬁgure plots the ratio of the time-varying variance, computed using the smoothed regime probabilities as
described in equation (22), to the unconditional variance for the inﬂation, output gap and interest rate series.
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Figure 6: Contribution of Monetary Policy to the Volatility [
√
V̂ ar[Xt|Passive]/
√
V̂ ar(Xt)]
This ﬁgure plots the volatility ratio between the counterfactual volatility of the three macro variables, conditional
on the monetary policy regime always being in the passive regime, and their time-varying volatility (calculated using
the smoothed probabilities).
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Figure 7: Contribution of Monetary Policy to the Volatility [
√
V̂ ar(Xt)/
√
V̂ ar[Xt|Active]]
This ﬁgure plots the volatility ratio between the time-varying volatility (calculated using the smoothed probabilities)
of the three macro variables and their counterfactual volatility, conditional on the monetary policy regime always
being in the active regime.
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Figure 8: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Unconstrained Model)
This ﬁgure shows the smoothed probabilities of the regimes in the unrestricted regime-switching New-Keynesian
Macro model with four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the
high inﬂation shock volatility regime and the high output shock volatility regime. Panel B shows the smoothed
probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy regime, and the high interest rate shock volatility regime.
NBER recessions are shaded gray.
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